Comment
PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE 1980's:
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE
MEANS OF MINOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The complaints were finally withdrawn on July 26, 1983. The
judge had found it necessary to adjourn the proceedings on four
previous occasions before hearing the merits of the petty disorderly
persons case before him. The plaintiff, a young woman in her early
twenties, had filed a civil complaint against a former boyfriend for
making harassing telephone calls to her home. Angered by the charges
pending against him, the defendant filed a countercomplaint. The
young woman's mother and her new boyfriend then signed complaints
in their own names. The mother of the defendant responded by
bringing counter charges, alleging the cause of the problems to be
alcohol abuse in the other family's home. What began as a dispute
between two individuals with a long, involved relationship had become a complicated, vindictive court battle amongst five. Administrative and court time totaled in excess of thirty hours before the judge
was informed by the parties at the final hearing that all they wished
was to be left alone.'
Occurrences such as this are commonplace: an angry argument
between two individuals culminates in the initiation of proceedings in
a lower level criminal or municipal court. 2 Unfortunately, the professional adjudicatory system is unlikely to get beyond the confines of the
3
particular disposition and speak to the ultimate issues of such a case:
What is the underlying cause of the dispute between these individuals? 4 How might their degenerating relationship be positively restructured? 5 This problem arises not only in disputes between neigh-

Interview with Hon. Gary Bennett, Municipal Court Judge, Kearny, New Jersey (Aug. 2,
1983). The case was adjourned the first two times because only four of the five parties appeared
for the hearing. The third and fourth adjournments involved considerations of the parties' rights
to retain counsel. Id.
2 Sander, Report on the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution, 1977 A.B.A.
REP. 1, 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
I Panel Discussion (Current Developments in Judicial Administration: Papers Presented at
the Plenary Session of the American Association of Law Schools), Panel II: Let the Tribunal Fit
the Case-Establishing Criteria For Channeling Matters into Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
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bors, but frequently involves conflicts between landlords and tenants,
consumers and merchants, even friends and family members.,
Within the past several years, widespread concern has arisen
with respect to the manner in which society has chosen to resolve
various types of minor disputes.7 In particular, there exists a growing
two-fold awareness that: (1) Quantitatively, the courts are overburdened" with increasingly more complex and expensive litigation;9 and
(2) Qualitatively, the courts are being utilized to resolve a variety of
problems which might more effectively be resolved by other mediative
agencies or methods.' 0 With regard to the qualitative concern, utilizing the court system as the sole means of resolving society's disputes
has been criticized not only for its failure to expose the underlying
causes of a controversy, but for its tendency to encourage antagonistic
postures between disputants, and for its limited range of available
remedies." This Comment will focus upon the qualitative reasons for

(Dec. 28, 1977), printed in 80 F.R.D. 147, 167, 178 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor)
[hereinafter cited as Panel II].
6 Sander, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. "Minor disputes" involve problems which arise in everyday life. A.B.A. Special
Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, Pub. Servs. Activities Div., Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys? 1, 21 (Panel Discussion Series, Topic 1 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Bane or Boon]. These claims generally are considered to be economically
unfeasible to assert, involve no constitutional or statutorily protected rights, and are not governed by the principle of stare decisis. Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and the
Seventh Amendment, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 963 (1977). The importance of such disputes to the
parties themselves, however, as well as their collective impact upon society, cannot be overemphasized. Id.
8 Address by S. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed
in 70 F.R.D. 79, 96, 97 [hereinafter cited as Rifkind].
I Bok, a flawed system, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38, 40. With regard to the
quantitative concern, statistics indicate that should the federal appellate courts continue to hear
cases for the next 40 years at the same rate at which they have entertained them from the period
beginning in the mid-1960's to the present, by the year 2010, the federal courts alone can be
expected to decide approximately one million cases each vear. Address by F. Sander, Varieties of
Dispute Processing, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9 1976). printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 [hereinafter cited as
Sander]. But see Bok, supra, at 40 ("[c]ontrarv to popular belief, it is not clear that we are a
madly litigious society. . . . The number of cases actually litigated in the United States does not
appear to be rising much faster than the population as a whole"). Bok acknowledges the
quantitative concern but characterizes it in terms of an increasing complexity in litigation
procedures, the growth in state administrative and statutory law, and the rising number of
attorneys practicing law. Id.
10 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 97. Disputants are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
remote nature of the traditional adversarial means of resolving a dispute, and are becoming
desirous of simple procedures that allow them to voice their grievances and at the same time
obtain prompt and constructive results. Sander, supra note 2, at 2.
11 Panel II, supra note 5, at 178 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
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alternative dispute resolution.' 2 The author embraces the school of
thought which maintains that a superior result is at once "the goal and
the test" in justifying a search for alternative forums.' 3 This rationale
is based on the belief that an overlegalized, overformalized method of
minor dispute resolution is often inefficient and, in some cases, even
counterproductive. 4 This belief in turn has provided much of the
social impetus for the development of community mediation programs, and serves as an independent justification for "diverting civil
cases away from the traditional judicial forum."' 5
The inability of the standard adversarial system of justice to process
minor disputes effectively is a natural outgrowth of large-scale urbanization,' 6 the growth of government, and the decline of nonjudicial
institutions traditionally engaged in dispute resolution. 18A tension has
arisen between those who feel courts have the competence and authority to act as society's general problem solvers19 and those who believe

"2Other rationales for diverting civil cases away from the traditional judicial forum include
the "'judicial overload" rationale in which the nonjudicial forum would be dealing with the
"precise same cases" as the courts but serving a "pre-processing" function, id. at 174; and the
'access to justice" rationale, where the justification for utilizing alternative forums stems
from a
concern that for the average individual the excessive cost of litigation "constitutes a total bar to
the judicial process." Id. at 175.
1'Id. at 179.
14 id. at 178; see supra text accompanying note 1.
15Panel II, supra note 5, at 173.
16 Sander, supra note 2, at 1. "[T~he quickening pace of modern life has increased substantially the number of potential collisions between individuals .. ."Id.
' Address by Hon. E.H. Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 212, 214 [hereinafter cited as Levi]. A
tremendous increase in the dimensions of government has been a chief factor in the growth of
judicial business. Id. In addition, the legislature has relied increasingly upon the courts. The
creation of new categories of legal obligations and rights has resulted in more frequent resort to
the courts for enforcement and interpretation. Through both juducial review and private
litigation, the courts have been used as a means of monitoring the legislative activity of the
executive. Id.
js Sander, supra note 2, at 2. Former U.S. Attorney General Edward H. Levi has stated:
"The expansion of governmental concern may in part be the product of the decline in private
institutions- the church, the family, and the community . . . that once imparted values and so
controlled conduct." Levi, supra note 17, at 214.
"oSee Rifkind, supra note 8, at 102. Those who belong to this school of thought see the courts
as society's "jacks of all trades." Levi, supra note 17, at 213. Problem solving allocates to the
courts the types of problems between individuals which could better be handled by the family,
church, or community group, as well as those problems of broad social concern, such as the
proper administration of schools, welfare departments, hospitals, and other institutions. Sander,
supra note 9, at 114. This new role has been projected as the "wave of the future": judges
presiding at proceedings where "there is no clear alignment of parties," and no refuge is taken in
procedural matters such as the burden of proof. Rifkind, supra note 8, at 102. In the case where
questions of broad social policy are concerned, the edict is not confined to the parties before the
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that the courts should be confined to their traditional role. 20 Social
commentators have described the present stage of American legal
development as a romantic period 2' marked by uncertainty as to the
proper scope of the courts' dimensions and reach. 22 In any event, the
"judicialization of relationships" 23 is a rapidly spreading phenomenon.
Several commentators have proposed judicial reform 24 whereby the
courts would retain jurisdiction over disputes involving complex legal
issues requiring full and careful judicial consideration, while yielding
jurisdiction where a reallocation might provide a more expedient
result. Support for this approach exists as an historical outgrowth of a
25
deeply rooted, uniquely American course of events.

court, but works "avulsive changes" upon the community as well. Id. The failure of judges to
perceive the full impact of their decisions on the surrounding environment in such situations has
been postulated as an argument against utilizing the court as a tool to achieve constructive social
change. See Bok, supra note 9, at 43.
20 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 101. "Heretofore, the accepted model of an American court was
that of an institution devoted to the resolution of disputes." Id. The traditional model would
reserve for the courts the jurisdiction to resolve "concrete" disputes involving clear questions of
law. Levi, supra note 17, at 216.
21 Levi, supra note 17, at 215.
22

Id.

23 Id.

"The short and simple reason for the assumption by the courts of tasks that are

allegedly 'beyond their competence' is the failure of supposedly competent institutions to perform
those tasks effectively or with adequate protection of the rights of the clients of those institutions." Address by Hon. A.L. Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court
Reform, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 134, 155 [hereinafter cited as Higginbotham]. Judge Higginbotham, a U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, has observed:
[I]n the best of all possible judicial worlds, judges should not be asked to run
railroads or to function as school superintendents or to serve as chief executive
officers of state prison systems. But if supposedly competent businessmen so manage
a railroad that it collapses into bankruptcy, or if supposedly professional educators
countenance or are powerless to deal with de jure segregation in the school systems
they are charged to administer, or supposedly competent corrections personnel
preside over a prison system that is riddled with constitutional violations, then judges
have no choice but to intervene. The courts . . . are not reaching out for these
responsibilities; they come to the courts by default.
Id.
24 The current resurgence of interest in innovative methods for resolving disputes may
properly be characterized as a "reform" movement. The current emphasis on informal methods
of dispute resolution may represent a loss of faith on the part of the public in established
institutions such as the courts, and professions such as the law and the judiciary. Bane or Boon,
supra note 7, at 18; see also Address by Hon. W.E. Burger, Agenda for 2,000 A.D. -A Need for
Systematic Anticipation, National Conference on Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 83, 91 (identifying loss of
public confidence caused by lawyers using courts to further their own interests without reference

to interest of public at large) [hereinafter cited as Burger].
25 Bok, supra note 9, at 42. Dr. Bok suggests that the struggle to embrace such cornerstone
American values as "individualism, competition, and success," while leading to personal free-
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The sociological schism represented by the "problem solver/traditional issue resolver" dichotomy 26 regarding the courts' proper role
provides a fundamental frame of reference for evaluating the courts'
capability to meet current social demands. Perhaps the most important question to ask in a qualitative analysis such as this is whether the
courts should continue to be not only traditional resolvers of hard legal
issues but general problem solvers as well. 27 If one is to determine the
viability of alternative forums, one must bear in mind the kinds of
problems the courts currently are being called upon to resolve.
To determine whether the court is the most appropriate forum to
resolve a certain dispute, it is necessary to examine the unique disputeresolving methods courts employ. 2 8 Those "nearly universal" 29 attributes include: "(1) adjudicationby a (2) professional law-trained judge
(occasionally assisted by a jury) (3) on the basis of adversarialpresentations by (4) the contending disputants, who bear full responsibility
for investigation of the facts of the dispute, [and] the research of the
applicable law.... 30 Adjudication, the system's primary process of
dispute resolution, 3' affords the litigant an institutionally guaranteed
opportunity to present proofs and argument in his favor. 32 "[T]he use
of a third party with coercive power, the usually 'win or lose' nature
of the decision, and the tendency of the decision to focus narrowly on
the immediate matter in issue as distinguished from a concern with
the underlying relationship between the parties," all have been de33
scribed as characteristic of the process.
Adjudication, however, is only one method of resolving a dispute;3 4 dispute resolution may be performed by a variety of alterna-

dom, often becomes a fierce battle. Id. When this happens, "the rules of the game tend to
multiply and the umpire's burden grows constantly heavier." Id. In this scenario, Bok asserts, the
inadequacy of the traditional adversary approach becomes clear. Id.
20 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 101.
27 Id.
28 Sander, supra note 9, at 113; see also Panel II, supra note 5, at 167 (remarks of Maurice
Rosenberg, Moderator).
21 Panel 1I,supra note 5, at 169 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
30 Id. (emphasis in original). It is significant to note that no important institution serves only
one function. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 912 (1979). As a
"multifunctional" institution in society, a court not only adjudicates disputes but also allocates
resources, confers legitimacy, administers other institutions, promulgates norms, allocates costs,
and records statistics. Id. at 911. This analysis, however, concerns only the adjudicative function.
31 Sander, supra note 9, at 114.
32 Id. at 115.
13 Id.; see also Panel II, supra note 5, at 167 (remarks of Maurice Rosenberg, Moderator).
3' Cover, supra note 30, at 910.
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tive means, including avoidance, which is characterized by a " 'withdrawal from . . . the dispute-producing relationship' "; 35 factfinding,
in which attempts are made to induce settlement based upon the
independent judgment of a neutral third party; 36 conciliation, which
involves negotiation between disputants; 37 mediation, which is
marked by negotiation and the recommendation of possible settlement
terms; 38 arbitration,in which parties agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision; 39 and persuasive justice, in which the decision of a
neutral third party is strengthened by "publicity or other sanctions
40
short of judicial enforcement.

35 Sander, supra note 9, at 117 (quoting Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on
Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc. REv. 63 n.1 (1974)). Made possible by the technological
anonymity of modern society, avoidance has become an increasingly common form of reacting to
controversy, replete with heavy personal and social costs. Id.; see also Panel II, supra note 5, at
188 (remarks of Frank E.A. Sander, Commentator). Examples of avoidance include a child
leaving home, a tenant moving to another apartment, or a businessman terminating a commercial relationship. Sander, supra note 9, at 117. The very existence of a social response such as
avoidance illustrates the error of current reliance on the judicial mechanism as the sole means of
resolving society's disputes. But see Panel II, supra note 5, at 183 ("a system which gives too little
reinforcement to the virtue of forbearance can be a menance and even a cause of injustice to
those who are beset by unjust claims" (emphasis added)) (remarks of Paul D. Carrington,
Commentator). Where the cost of dispute resolution is borne by the public rather than by the
disputants themselves, there is a danger that the system will suffer from "overuse" at which point
the "irreducible minimum cost of correction" is deemed "excessive" for society to bear. Id. In
response to the above, Sander stresses the long-term, cost-benefit analysis:
Obviously it is cheaper in the short run to provide no means of redress for some
disputes. But what is the ultimate psychic cost to the individuals who are thus left
with festering concerns, and what is the potential social cost if that concern ultimately erupts into violence or destruction?
Id. at 188 (remarks of Frank E.A. Sander, Commentator).
36 Sander, supra note 9, at 116. Fact finding exists as a hybrid of adjudication and mediation
or conciliation. Like adjudication, a fact finding inquiry typically resembles a judicial proceeding, yet as in mediation, the adjudicating officer normally has no coercive power over the parties
to the dispute. Further, the parties to a fact finding inquiry often have "no right to any agreedupon form of presentation and participation." Id. Nevertheless, fact finding may still be a
"potent tool for inducing settlement" in that if both parties respect the independent judgment of
the fact finder, his summary of the situation will often be difficult to refute. Id.
37 Panel II, supra note 5, at 169 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
38 Id. at 169-70.
19 Id. at 170. Arbitration exists as a subvariant of the adjudication process insofar as arbitration hearings quite often resemble judicial proceedings. Decisions are rationalized according to
general principles, but unlike adjudication, the disputants often have a choice in the selection of
the arbitrator who will preside over the dispute. In the case of compulsory arbitration, the legal
rules are also usually set forth. Thus, in arbitration, the parties not only often have control over
the selection of the adjudicator, but play a role in determining the governing principles as well.
Sander, supra note 9, at 117.
40 Panel II, supra note 5, at 170 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). An example of
persuasive justice would be an ombudsman office. Id. An ombudsman is a public official who
acts as a go-between in disputes between private citizens and large organizations, reducing the
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From a qualitative perspective, dispute resolution seeks to implement the processes of conciliation or mediation 41 as the primary alternatives to the adjudication of minor disputes. 42 Its central quality is
the " 'capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect
their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.' -43 The use of a
third party facilitator is again involved 44 but, unlike the judge, the
dispute resolver maintains no coercive power 45 and often is drawn
from outside the legal community. 46 By their very definition, mediation and conciliation are informal processes whereby disputants are
47
encouraged to express subjective feelings as well as objective facts.
Common notions of fairness and equity often replace complex legal
rules as the bases for decisions. 48 In essence, mediation and conciliation involve a probing of the basis of the conflict in the underlying
relationship, in contrast to adjudication, where the sole concentration
49
is on the surface dispute.
Qualitative inquiry emphasizes its own distinct criteria for analyzing a particular dispute to determine whether it should be solved
50
by adjudication or reallocated to a more qualified alternative forum.
The single most significant factor is whether the alternative forum can
be expected to resolve the dispute in a more satisfactory manner than

inherent inequality of expertise and power involved in these conflicts. Sander, supra note 2, at
17.
'I Panel II, supra note 5, at 178 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). "Forums implementing the 'superior process' rationale seek to substitute conciliation, mediation, and what
might be characterized as a short-term therapy for the adjudicatory process." Id.
42

Id.

Sander, supra note 9, at 115 (quoting Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and Functions, 44 S.
CAL. L. REv. 305, 325 (1971)).
41

44

Id.

45

Id.

Panel II, supra note 5, at 178 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). Psychologists,
subject matter experts, and common citizens are often employed as "dispute resolvers" in
addition to lawyers and professional judges. Id. at 170. Lawyers, however, are often excluded
entirely from the alternative dispute processing system. See Bane or Boon, supra note 7, at 26-27.
47 Panel II, supra note 5, at 178 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). A dispute that may
have been dismissed in a few minutes by a judge may often take hours to resolve in an alternative
forum. This added expenditure of time is justified by the belief that the result achieved in the
alternative forum will be qualitatively superior to that reached by the court. Id.
46

48

Id.

11 Sander, supra note 2, at 13; see also Panel II, supra note 5, at 178 (remarks of Earl
Johnson, Jr., Presentor); Sander, supra note 9, at 115.
50 Panel II, supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).

1984]

COMMENT

would the courts. 5' Common sense dictates that certain types of disputes are inherently better suited to resolution by an alternative forum
than to the adversarial confrontation of a judicial proceeding. 52 Nevertheless, certain identifiable variables have been recognized as signif54
icant in fitting the forum 53 to the particular dispute in question.
Qualitative analysis focuses on two variables: the nature of the dispute 55 and the relationship between disputants. 5
Clearly, the adjudicative process is an inappropriate means of
resolving certain types of disputes. This is due in large measure to the
fact that traditional methods of dispute resolution presuppose a monocentric5 7 rather than a polycentric 58 problem. As relationships between individuals are multifaceted, 59 the problems arising often are
incapable of resolution within the win or lose orientation of the adjudicative framework. In many situations there is no single solution to

11Id. Under the "judicial overload" rationale, the significant "reallocation criterion" is
"'whether the parties are likely to be satisfied with the outcome in the alternative forum" so that
appeal becomes unlikely. Id. at 175 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). Factors such as
"the amount in dispute, the credibility of the non-judicial forum and the persuasiveness of any
disincentives to appeal" become important. Id. Under the "access to justice" rationale, the
reallocation criterion is "whether a person of reasonable means could afford to prosecute or
defend this kind of dispute in the regular courts." Id. at 177 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr.,
Presentor). If not, assignment to an alternative forum provides the opportunity to resolve valid
everyday types of concerns that are not economically feasible to litigate. Id. at 175 (remarks of
Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor); see Burger, supra note 24, at 93. Under a "qualitative" rationale, a
superior result is both the "goal" and the "test." Reallocation is justified upon the basis of the
likelihood of reaching a substantially superior result. Johnson has termed the third rationale the
"superior process" rationale and assigns to nonjudicial forums those types of cases uniquely suited
to resolution by the special attributes that each of the alternative processes possess. Panel II,
supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor). Cost efficiency is not a primary
consideration under the "superior process" rationale, as most disputes heard by alternative
forums occupy more time and are more costly than are the courts on a per case basis. Id.
52 Panel II, supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
11 The term "fitting the forum" is taken from the introductory remarks of the Panel Discussion which stated the theme, "Let the Forum Fit the Fuss." Panel II, supra note 5, at 166
(remarks of Maurice Rosenberg, Moderator).
54 Sander, supra note 9, at 118. Sander has suggested the following criteria: nature of the
dispute, relationship between disputants, amount in dispute, cost, and speed. Id. at 118-26.
55 Id. at 118.
56 Panel II, supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
51 Monocentric or "single-centered" problems can be resolved in yes or no, either-or fashion.
Hence, they lend themselves to resolution in the adversarial setting of the courtroom.
58 Fuller, Collective Bargainingand the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 1, 32-33. Polycentric,
or "many-centered" problems, involve a number of variables, and therefore are far less suited to
resolution by adjudication. Id.
11 Id. at 32-33. The potential for reordering the elements of a polycentric relationship is
likened to the internal restructuring of a spider's web, "[p]ull a strand here and a complex
pattern of adjustments runs through the whole web. Pull another strand from a different angle,
and another complex pattern results." Id. at 33.
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which the parties might address themselves in open court. The desired
result does not always consist of a choice between two alternatives,
but rather might be a combination of any number of possibilities. 0
Moreover, meaningful participation by the litigants through proofs
and arguments is lost6 ' to the extent that these traditional avenues of
input, perfectly appropriate in yes or no cases between diametrically
opposed parties, are not effective tools for resolving polycentric disputes.6 2 Stated simply, while some problems are readily adjudicable,
some are wholly unsuited to an adjudicative decision."3
The relationship between the parties is another factor to be considered in determining how a particular dispute might best be resolved. Disputes between individuals involved in long-term relation4
ships differ greatly from isolated disputes between strangers.
Disagreements between neighbors, family members, and individuals
involved in ongoing relationships may best be resolved by a process
which reserves for them the opportunity to compromise and maintain
control over the settlement terms.6 5 A distinction has been drawn
between individuals involved in a continuing emotional relationship,
such as members of a family, neighbors, or friends, and those involved
in a continuing "economic" relationship, such as landlord and tenant
or consumer and merchant.6 6 Negotiation and mediation are more
clearly preferable in emotional situations, but their benefits may be
67
said to apply to continuing interpersonal economic conflicts as well.
In reaching a mutually agreed upon solution, there is a greater chance
for a more satisfying and lasting result. Further, as mediation, conciliation, and negotiation entail a probing of the conflict in the underly-

I Id. at 32-33. Fuller makes reference to the solution in such situations as lying "in an
irregular pattern across a checkerboard of possibilities." Id. at 32.
81 Id. at 32-33.
62 Id. The "desired result" is characterized as an "optimum solution," yielding the greatest
utility to both parties. Id.
os See, e.g, id. Fuller cites the example of a wealthy testator in New York City who left a
collection of paintings in equal shares to two museums but whose will prescribed no apportionment. In such a situation, the problem of effecting a division in equal shares does not address
itself to a yes or no answer. See also Sander, supra note 9, at 118 (discussing the same example).
Sander, supra note 9, at 120.
65 Panel II, supra note 5, at 179.
66 Id.
67 Id. Clearly, there is a bond between friends and family members which makes settlement
from within preferable to an externally imposed settlement. In many instances a similar bond
exists between individuals involved in continuing economic relationships-local citizens and the
family mechanic or deli-man, for example. Often, the parties to these situations know that
beneath the surface of the immediate dispute lies a mutually beneficial tie well worth preserving.

1984]

COMMENT

ing relationship,68 it seems clear that parties to both types of relationships will benefit by employing these alternatives.19
As dispute resolution analysis "focuses on the social processes and
events with which institutions cope, "' 70 the institutional element essential to any practical application of the resolution techniques cannot be
ignored. The institutional structure for a system of interpersonal dispute resolution most often proposed is the notion of a Community
Dispute Settlement Center, or Neighborhood Justice Center,7 as it is
more commonly known. The Neighborhood Justice Center, which
operates in a flexible manner in disposing of both civil and criminal
cases, 72 seems likely to become an important element in our system of
justice. 7 3 It may exist independent of or dependent on the court, and
may receive cases by referral, 7 4 or even on a walk-in basis. 7 The
center usually employs the processes of mediation and arbitration, or
an informal method which combines the two. 76 The concept of a
"'multidoor courthouse"7 7 has been envisioned, in which an aggrieved
party would be "channeled through a screening clerk who would then
' 78
direct him to the process . . . most appropriate to his type of case.
The establishment of such an institution would ensure that any citizen
could first have his problem diagnosed, and then be referred either to
the court system or to the alternative forum best suited to solving that
79
individual's problem .

88 Sander, supra note 2, at 15. The capacity to probe the conflict in the underlying relationship is frequently cited as the single most advantageous aspect of the mediation process.
19 Panel II, supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
70 Cover, supra note 30, at 910.
71 Sander, supra note 2, at 12. The term Neighborhood Justice Center was first put forward
in the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force Report, reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159 (1976).
72 Panel II, supra note 5, at 173 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
13 Id. Neighborhood Justice Centers have great potential for future significance because
"they are organized to refer people to the courts, social services agencies or lawyers when the
problems [before them] are not suitable either for mediation or arbitration." Id. This commitment to cooperation with the traditional system of adjudication reflects a realistic assessment of
the needs of a society embroiled in disputes of considerable variety.
14 Sander, supra note 2, at 12. Referral may be from the courts, prosecutors, police, or social
agencies. Id.
75

Id.

Id. at 13. In so-called "Med-Arb" for example, the first goal is to arrive at a voluntary
settlement. If that is not successful, the dispute resolver can issue a binding decision. Panel II,
supra note 5, at 170 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
77 The term "multidoor court house" was first coined at a meeting of the American Bar
Association's Young Lawyer's Division and Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute
Resolution, held in New Orleans, Louisiana, August 11, 1981. See Bane or Boon, supra note 7, at
12.
78 Sander, supra note 9, at 131.
76

78

Id.
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The premise of the reform, of course, is that society will profit
from a system that utilizes alternative means of resolving disputes.
Mediation, as an informal alternative8 0 to a court proceeding, provides the opportunity to achieve a deeper, more informed understanding of the sources of conflict between individuals, and to resolve minor
interpersonal disputes by the dictates of common sense rather than by
formalistic legal rules and procedures. Similarly, polycentric disputes
can better be resolved by a process of compromise which involves a
consideration of the multifaceted needs of both parties. Although the
reform movement has great social potential, its fervor is tempered by
significant constraints.
Initially, the institutional application involves some practical
limitations. Specifically, the concept of a Neighborhood Justice Center should be evaluated in terms of the important due process objections it has provoked.8 1 Where the Neighborhood Justice Center maintains a formal link to the court system, there is an inherent risk of
coercion. 82 By providing what appears to be a less extreme alternative
to a court proceeding, these programs may encourage potential defendants to forego the procedural safeguards afforded by a judicial
proceeding.8 3 It is feared that the seventh amendment right to jury
trial may be compromised where alternative dispute resolution is
employed. 84 The seventh amendment provides, in part: "In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. "85 Since most
of the cases coming before alternative tribunals fall squarely within
the seventh amendment category of disputes mandating the right to
trial by jury, 86 many critics of the reform find the seventh amendment
Sander, supra note 2, at 10.
"j Panel II, supra note 5, at 188 (remarks of Frank E.A. Sander, Commentator). The due
process issues frequently cited with reference to alternative means of dispute resolution include
the "fairness of the procedures," the right to a trial by jury, and the right to legal counsel. Id.
'2Sander, supra note 2, at 14.
83 Id.
4 See generally Stanley, supra note 7.
85 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
88 Stanley, supra note 7, at 968. It is important to note that the seventh amendment
guarantee of the right to a civil jury trial has not been incorporated under the fourteenth
amendment as a constitutional mandate applicable to the states. Id. at 966. It has been stated
that reluctance on the part of the judiciary to impose on the states the burden of the seventh
amendment has been a major reason why total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment has not been effectuated. Panel II, supra note 5, at 186 (remarks of
Robert B. Kent, Commentator). In practice, however, the states have been so influenced by the
federal guarantee that state constitutional provisions have been given " 'essentially uniform
effect.' " Stanley, supra note 7, at 966-67 (quoting F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.1, at 337
(1965)).
80
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objection critical. 87 It is here asserted, however, that this objection is
outweighed by the necessity of providing alternative forums for resolving the minor civil disputes contemplated by this Comment.88
Moreover, there are a number of ways in which seventh amendment
rights could be safeguarded.
First, it must be remembered that the right to a civil jury trial
can constitutionally be waived. 89 By making an express waiver of this
right a prerequisite to having one's case heard in a noncourt forum,
these forums could avoid any denial of constitutional rights.90 This
could be accomplished through the use of a "notice of express waiver"
provision similar to those which have been held valid in written
agreements to arbitrate. 91

87

See Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of

Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 488 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Redish
Study]. In view of the current "rational interpretation" of the seventh amendment, the issue as to
whether, in interpreting the scope of the seventh amendment, the courts should be influenced by
the many problems posed by the use of the civil jury, appears to be largely academic. The courts'
adoption of the rational approach takes into account the changed social conditions of modern
society in interpreting the reach of the seventh amendment and provides a right to jury trial in
many cases where a strict "historical approach" would have denied it. Id. Under the strict
"historical approach," judicial recognition is taken of the amendment's use of the term "preserved." The amendment is interpreted to mean that in ascertaining whether the seventh
amendment right to jury trial exists, reference must be made to determine whether the actual
cause of action existed under the common law established at the time of the adoption of the
constitutional provision in 1791. Id. at 486. Use of the historical approach has been deemed
inadvisable in view of the inherent difficulties in determining what causes of action existed under
the common law of 1791, which claims were "legal" (and thus called for a jury trial), and which
were "equitable" (for which there was no right to jury trial). Id. These difficulties were
compounded by the merger of law and equity in the federal system. Most importantly, application of a strict historical approach has the effect of placing "modern judicial administration in an
historical strait jacket" controlled by outmoded policies of two centuries ago. Id. at 487. Today,
short of constitutional amendment or outright civil jury repeal, the seventh amendment right to
jury trial applies to the category of disputes contemplated by alternative dispute resolution
reform. Stanley, supra note 7, at 968; see also Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Redish Legislative Response]; Panel II, supra note 5, at 185 (remarks of Robert B.
Kent, Commentator).
88 Panel II, supra note 5, at 186 (remarks of Robert B. Kent, Commentator); see Rifkind,
supra note 8, at 107. The category of disputes referred to are, to the extent that it is possible to
define them, "a class of controversies, modest in amount, not very significant in principle, which
need resolution for the peace and harmony of the community, but which do not need the
courts." Id. This analysis in particular refers to minor disputes between individuals involved in
continuing economic or emotional relationships where problems of a polycentric nature are
involved. See Panel II, supra note 5, at 179 (remarks of Earl Johnson, Jr., Presentor).
88 Redish Legislative Response, supra note 87, at 799.
90 Stanley, supra note 7, at 968.
81 Redish Legislative Response, supra note 87, at 799 n.253.
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Second, in those instances where the Neighborhood Justice Center is completely independent of the courts,9 2 the same problem takes
on a slightly different aspect. Here, the concern that a potential
defendant may be "coerced" into foregoing the procedural safeguards
provided by a trial by jury is replaced by another seventh amendment
concern: the ability of the legislature to compel certain categories of
disputants to utilize alternative forums before they are able to seek
redress in the courts.9 3 Generally, the effect of a mandate of nonjury
adjudication has been upheld, provided a right of appeal with the
94
possibility of a trial de novo exists.
The seventh amendment trial by jury concern aside, a further
problem in the practical application of alternative dispute resolution
through institutions such as the Neighborhood Justice Center is that of
assuring disputants confidentiality with regard to information revealed at a neighborhood justice hearing. 95 The danger exists that a
prosecutor may admit into evidence disclosures made at such a hearing should the case subsequently come to trial.9" Program directors
recognize this danger, and repeatedly have called for state legislation

92 To date, most Neighborhood Justice Centers have maintained a formal link to the criminal
system, most cases being diverted to the Neighborhood Justice Center from either the court or the
prosecuting attorney. Sander, supra note 2, at 14. Formal links to the system result in a high
attendance rate. A.B.A. Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, Pub.
Servs. Activities Div., Alternative Dispute Resolution: Who's in Charge of Mediation?, at iii
(Panel Discussion Series, Topic 2 1982).
01 Sander, supra note 2, at 15.
91 Id. at 15 n.24. "With respect to the effect of providing a non-jury adjudication and a right
of appeal with a trial de novo, Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), clearly indicates
that such a procedure would satisfy the requirements of the seventh amendment." Stanley, supra
note 7, at 969. In Hof the Supreme Court stated:
"The authority of the legislature, consistently with the constitutional provisions
securing the right to trial by jury, to provide, in civil proceedings for the recovery of
money, that the trial by jury should not be had in the tribunal of first instance, but
in an appellate court only, is supported by unanimous judgments of this court in two
earlier cases ...
"
Id. (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 19 (1899)).
This "two tier" doctrine recently has been applied by the Supreme Court in North v.
Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976). Stanley, supra note 7, at 970 & n.14. In North, it was held that an
accused is not denied due process of law when tried before a nonlawyer police court judge when
a right to a later trial de novo is available. North, 427 U.S. at 337. This same doctrine was again
followed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Lecates v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 4,
637 F.2d 898, 911 (3d Cir. 1980), where the court held that "a civil defendant's due process right
to a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' entails the right to a jury trial . . . at some point
during the process of adjudication."
'5 Sander, supra note 2, at 14.
11 See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, STATE
LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Monograph No. 1, June 1982), at ii [hereinafter cited as
STATE LEGISLATION].
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in the area of alternative dispute reform.9 7 It is clear that in states
which have not passed such legislation, strict confidentiality may be
promised but cannot be assured.98
Unfortunately, the alternative dispute resolution movement is
subject to limitations far more significant than these institutional
inadequacies. The push for alternative means of resolving disputes
fosters a dangerous paradox. By purporting to "alleviate the persistent
inaccessibility of judicial relief for the poor and middle-class people by
providing cheaper and less formal methods for resolving disputes,- 99 it
risks encouraging a denial of access to those persons for whom the
court system is the appropriate mechanism for securing individual
rights. 0 0 With the broadening of available forums, the fact that some
rights must be asserted through traditional litigation procedures
should not be overlooked.' 0 ' Recourse to extrajudicial alternatives can
only be justified as a proper means of resolving certain of society's
disputes. Thus, social policymakers must be aware of the inherent
inapplicability of alternative procedures to certain extremely sensitive
areas marked by complex legal questions, such as the area of human
rights. 102
In advising caution in alternative dispute reform, it must be
noted that, from the opposite perspective, some have expressed doubts
as to the competence, resources, or remedial powers of the courts to
run mental hospitals, schools, or welfare departments. 0 3 It is here
strongly asserted that there must be no reallocation of the responsibility of the court to act as the ultimate agency for the protection of the
rights of the disadvantaged. 0 4 Although most recognize that the

11Id. at 3. The New York State Legislature has responded by passing a dispute resolution
act, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The act states:
[A]ll memoranda, work products, or case files of a mediator are confidential and not
subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding. Any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution made during the resolution
process by any participant, mediator, or any other person present at the dispute
resolution shall be a confidential communication.
Id. at § 849-6.6.
"' STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 96, at 3.
99 Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979).
100See Higginbotham, supra note 23, at 135.
101 Id.
102

Id. at 137.

Levi, supra note 17, at 217. An oft-repeated example is Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) which "plac[ed] the mental health system of the State of Alabama under
the supervision of the federal court." Levi, supra note 17, at 217.
10 Higginbotham, supra note 23, at 158. An accurate definition of what might be termed
"human rights" for the purpose of this analysis includes:
103

1000
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courts are not infallible problem solvers, there is no consensus that
courts should decline jurisdiction where a possible denial of constitutional rights is involved. In determining the appropriate forum for
resolving the disputes arising in a given area, a balance must be struck
between the state's interest in protecting the rights of its citizens and
society's interest in resolving disputes in the most effective way possible. The relevant inquiry is whether the present allocation is necessary
to uphold some essential value, or whether a reallocation might facilitate resolution through a more qualified forum.10 5 In choosing a forum for the resolution of human rights disputes, efficiency arguments' 06 clearly do not apply: A state's interest in protecting human
rights must always prevail.
Although, as the foregoing arguments have stressed, caution must
be exercised in developing alternative means of dispute resolution, it is
clear that such alternatives must be pursued. Perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of reallocation to alternative forums is that it makes
sense to do so. Viewing the problem from a qualitative perspective,
the legal rights of the average individual are often severely limited by
the inability of the courts to resolve certain categories of minor disputes effectively. If this situation is to be reversed, it is essential to

the right to be free from racial or sexual discrimination, the right to vote, the right to
basic protection from overpowering forces of the industrial age, the right to be secure
in one's person and property, and the right to be treated with courtesy and consideration by a system that purports to be, one of justice, not merely of law.
Id.
105Address by Hon. Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts,
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 231, 235.
101See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 23, at 153. To illustrate the point, Higginbotham
documents one instance of how the judicial process can be insensitive to the needs of its citizens in
the areas of human rights:
A black woman was testifying in her own behalf in a habeas corpus proceeding.
"The state solicitor persisted in addressing all Negro witnesses by their first names"
and when he addressed the petitioner as Mary, she refused to answer, insisting that
the prosecutor address her as "Miss Hamilton." The trial judge directed her to
answer, but again she refused. The trial judge then cited her for contempt. On
appeal, the highest court in the state affirmed, because the record showed the
witness's name was "Mary Hamilton," not "Miss Mary Hamilton." Happily, the
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and summarily reversed the
judgment of contempt. Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650, 84 S. Ct. 982, 11 L.Ed.
2d 979 (1964), rev'g 275 Ala. 574, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963). Some might say that this
case exemplified an unjustifiable waste of legal time and judicial efforts. ...
Id. (footnote omitted).
Higginbotham disagrees, "At the core of this case was a person begging that a system which
is supposed to dispense justice treat her with dignity and the kind of sensitivity that courts
automatically accord to persons of power and prestige." Id. at 153-54.
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identify those categories of minor disputes which can be resolved
without resort to adjudication. 1°7 Reallocation to alternative forums
based on a set of qualitative criterion would involve an evaluation of
the nature of the dispute and the relationship between the disputants
in terms of the unique dispute resolving characteristics of the courts.
By reallocating to mediation or conciliation only those types of minor
disputes which could more satisfactorily be resolved by avoiding resort
to the courts, alternative dispute reform would ensure that the most
effective dispute resolving process was employed in each particular
case. The time is right for a reallocation to alternative forums of
polycentric disputes between individuals involved in continuing emotional or economic relationships. 108 Such cases demand a process with
the capacity to facilitate renewed understanding of the relationship
between individuals, 0 9 as well as to mold compromises which reflect
an understanding of the multifaceted needs involved. In short, it is
essential that such conflicts be resolved in the forum best able to
respond to the nature of the dispute, the relationship between the
disputants, and the needs of the community at large." 0
Despite its potential for great social benefit, the trend towards
utilizing alternative measures should be one of cautious reform. First,
the seventh amendment right to trial by jury poses a constitutional
due process constraint upon alternative dispute reform. The mechanisms of knowing waiver and right of appeal with a trial de novo
appear to accommodate sufficiently the constitutional mandate so as
not to threaten the jury trial rights of the disputants involved. Further, there is much in the literature of the seventh amendment itself to
suggest that its mechanical application"' to the area of minor dispute
reform is misguided." 2
The ability to bring the law to the "touchstone of common sense"
has been cited as the essential merit of the civil jury. 1 3 Alternative
dispute tribunals provide the opportunity to achieve the very same
result. Although civil juries generally discharge their duties according
to the mandates of common sense, it is not at all clear that this
common sense function is beyond the ken of a Neighborhood Justice

107 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 107-08.

108See Sander, supra note 2, at 13.
109 Id.
110 Panel II, supra note 5, at 186 (remarks of Robert B. Kent, Commentator).

" See supra text accompanying note 87.
112 Id.
13

Redish Study, supra note 87, at 489.
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Clinic. In fact, it seems likely that an informal, open forum would be
even more conducive to sensible, reasonable solutions than the formal,
structured jury which must decide the facts of each case solely by
reference to the proofs presented to it by clever adversaries. Perhaps
more significantly, there is no reason to view alternative dispute
resolution and due process of law as mutually exclusive. Providing
prospective participants in an informal resolution proceeding with
notice of their constitutional rights and the opportunity to be heard on
appeal would seem to afford such participants the process due them.
Irrespective of specific procedural devices it must be remembered that
due process requires that parties to a given dispute must be treated in
a manner that is fundamentally fair.
Viewing alternative dispute resolution from that perspective, it
seems clear that in some cases, this method of problem solving might
not only be preferable to the traditional system of adjudication-it
might be required.1 14 Although reverence for the adversarial system
probably would preclude acknowledgement of this truth by the
powers that be, the fact remains that minor disputes between individuals are rarely handled fairly or efficiently by a system of adjudication
which ignores the fact that such individuals relate to one another in
ways that are essentially nonlegal. It is only when things start to fall
apart in such relationships that the parties recall that they are legal
creatures who can fight it out in court. Alternative forums would give
individuals the opportunity to preserve personal relationships rather
than forsake them in search of a favorable outcome from judge or
jury.
As significant as is the need to pursue cautious reform in this area
is the obligation this reform will impose upon the legal community. As
the President of Harvard University has observed, the future's greatest
opportunities lie not within the adversarial setting, but in employing
'
the "gentler arts""of communication, collaboration, and compromise. I'l
The 1980's present a challenge to the legal community to rise
to a calling which transcends the interests of the immediate profession
by responding to the needs of the society it seeks to serve. Professional

114 Address by Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), printed in 70 F.R.D. 79, 199, 208.
"- Bok, supra note 9, at 45.
116 Id.
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commitment to alternative dispute resolution can result in more responsive, creative, intelligent means of settling society's conflicts.
Jeanne A. Girgan

